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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
MARY L. SASSIN 
vs 
Petitioner, 
BOARD OF REVIEW OF THE 
INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION OF UTAH, 
DEPARTMENT OF EMPLOYMENT 
SECURITY AND WALMART STORES 
INC. 
Respondents. 
Case No. 960083-CA 
BRIEF OF PETITIONER 
APPELLATE JURISDICTION 
The Court of Appeals has jurisdiction in this matter pursuant to 
UTAH CODE ANN. § 63-46b-1 6( 1 ) . 
STATEMENT OF THE ISSUES 
ISSUE 1 
Was the determination by the Board of Review of the Industrial 
Commission of Utah, Department of Employment Security, (hereinafter 
the "Board") that it is a reasonable employment practice to require 
a switchboard operator to walk 100 feet to get a drink of water 
reasonable? 
1 
STANDARD OF REVIEW 
The determination whether the Board's decision relative to 
whether an individual is discharged for just cause will be reviewed 
under UTAH CODE ANN. § 63-46b-16(4)(h)(i) for reasonableness. 
Albertsons Inc. v. Dept. of Employment Security, 854 P.2d 570, 573 
(Utah App. 1993). 
PRESERVATION OF THE ISSUE 
(R. 56-57, 17, 30). 
ISSUE 2 
Was the Board's failure to consider Petitioner's contention, 
that the employer never showed the element of knowledge, arbitrary 
or capricious? 
STANDARD OF REVIEW 
This is a legal determination that requires no deference to 
the Commission pursuant to UTAH CODE ANN. § 63-46b-1 6(4) (h) . Adams 
v. Board of Review of Indus, Com'n, 821 P. 2d 1, 4 (Utah App. 1991). 
PRESERVATION OF THE ISSUE 
R. 57-59, 16, 24, 29-30). 
2 
ISSUE 3 
Was the Board's failure to consider Petitioner's contention, 
that the employer never showed the element of control, arbitrary or 
capricious? 
STANDARD OF REVIEW 
This is a legal determination that requires no deference to 
the Commission pursuant to UTAH CODE ANN. § 63-46b-16(4). Adams v. 
Board of Review of Indus. Com'n, 821 P.2d 1, 4 (Utah App. 1991). 
PRESERVATION OF THE ISSUE 
(R. 59, 30). 
ISSUE 4 
Was the Board's failure to consider Petitioner's contention, 
that the employer never showed the actions of Petitioner had a 
serious effect on the employee's job or the employer's interests, 
arbitrary or capricious? 
STANDARD OF REVIEW 
This is a legal determination that requires no deference to 
the Commission pursuant to UTAH CODE ANN. § 63-46b-16(4). Adams v. 
Board of Review of Indus. Com'nf 821 P.2d 1, 4 (Utah App. 1991). 
PRESERVATION OF THE ISSUE 
(R. 59-60, 36). 
3 
ISSUE 5 
Was the Board's failure to consider Petitioner's contention, 
that the employer never met its burden because the only evidence 
the employer presented was inadmissible hearsay, arbitrary or 
capricious? 
STANDARD OF REVIEW 
This is a legal determination that requires no deference to 
the Commission pursuant to UTAH CODE ANN. § 63-46b-16(4). Adams v. 
Board of Review of Indus. Com'n. 821 P.2d 1, 4 (Utah App. 1991). 
PRESERVATION OF THE ISSUE 
(R. 60-63, 13, 39, 5, 13, 16-18). 
CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS. STATUTES AND RULES 
Rule 562-5b-102(1)(a), Utah Administrative Code 
Rule 562-5b-102(1)(b), Utah Administrative Code 
Rule 562-5b-102(1)(c)(2), Utah Administrative Code 
Rule 562-5b-102(1)(c)(3), Utah Administrative Code 
Rule 562-5b-103(1), Utah Administrative Code 
Rule 562-5b-108(1)(a), Utah Administrative Code 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
NATURE OF THE CASE 
This case is before the Court on petition to review an order 
of the Department of Employment Security administrative agency. 
4 
COURSE OF PROCEEDINGS 
Petitioner was fired by WalMart. She applied for, and 
received, unemployment benefits. That decision was overturned by 
Department of Employment Security Administrative Law Judge Terry J. 
Kump (Hereinafter "ALJ") and affirmed by the Board. It is from 
that decision Petitioner appeals to this Court. 
DISPOSITION IN THE AGENCY 
The Board issued a final decision on January 5, 1996. The 
Board affirmed the decision of the ALJ in all respects denying 
Petitioner unemployment benefits. However, the Board reversed the 
ALJ relative to the repayment of unemployment benefits. The Board 
ordered Petitioner repay the benefits pursuant to UTAH CODE ANN. § 
35-4-406(5) instead of UTAH CODE ANN. § 35-4-406(4) as had been 
ordered by the ALJ. (R.71-75). 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
1 . Petitioner was hired by WalMart Stores on or about 
November 8, 1990. (R. 1). 
2. Petitioner was fired on or about August 1, 1995. (R. 1). 
3. Petitioner is a 57 year old woman (R. 1). 
4. Petitioner, at the time of firing, was a telephone 
switchboard operator working eight hours a day. (R. 15). 
5. Petitioner filed for unemployment insurance benefits on 
August 3, 1995. (R. 2-4). 
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6. A Department of Employment Security representative found 
Petitioner was not at fault in the discharge and granted Petitioner 
unemployment insurance benefits on August 18, 1995. (R. 4). 
7. WalMart, through the Frick Company, appealed the granting 
of unemployment insurance benefits on or about August 28, 1995. (R. 
7). 
8. WalMart's appeal was heard by ALJ, Terry J. Kump on 
October 11, 1995, at hearing in St. George, UT. (R. 12). 
FACTS RELEVANT TO ISSUE 1 
(Reasonableness of policy) 
9. The employer representative testified that Petitioner was 
fired for having a drink of water in the phone area contrary to 
store policy. (R. 18-19). 
10. The employer representative testified that Petitioner 
could get water by walking a distance of about 100 feet into a back 
room. (R. 17). 
11. Petitioner testified it was not easy to go into the back 
room to get a drink of water. (R. 20). 
12. The ALJ stated lfthe Administrative Law Judge finds the 
employer offered the claimant a reasonable alternative by 
permitting her to keep the beverage relatively close at hand but 
out of the customer sales area.11 (R. 38). 
13. The Board affirmed the decision of the ALJ in this 
regard. (R. 73). 
6 
FACTS RELEVANT TO ISSUE 2 
(Knowledge) 
14. The employer representative testified that the employee 
manual states that it is unacceptable to have food or drink on the 
floor area. (R. 16). 
15. The employer representative admitted that Petitioner's 
work area was separate from the customer flow area. (R. 29). 
16. Petitioner testified that her work area was not on the 
floor area. (R. 24-25). 
17. The employer representative testified that many employees 
had drinks in the area where Petitioner had her drink. (R. 30). 
18. The employer representative testified that Petitioner was 
the only employee ever fired for having a drink of water in the 
phone area. (R.30). 
19. Petitioner testified she was not the only phone operator 
who had water in the phone area. (R. 23). 
20. Petitioner testified she was fired because of a prior 
problem with the employer representative. (R. 20). 
21. Based on these facts, the ALJ found that Petitioner had 
the requisite knowledge of the drink policy. (R.38). 
22. Petitioner specifically appealed the ALJ's determination 
that the facts supported a finding of the requisite knowledge of 
the drink policy. (R. 57-59). 
23. In it's decision, the Board never addressed the issue of 
whether the element of knowledge of the drink policy was shown by 
the employer. (R. 71-75). 
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FACTS RELEVANT TO ISSUE 3 
(Control) 
24. Petitioner testified she had the drink in a phone area, 
in part, because of a strep infection from which she was suffering. 
(R. 20). 
25. In his decision, the ALJ made no determination of whether 
the element of control was shown. (R. 35-40). 
26. Petitioner specifically appealed this issue to the Board, 
arguing that due to the strep infection, Petitioner did not have 
the requisite control. (R. 59). 
27. In it's decision, the Board never addressed the issue of 
whether the element of control was shown by the employer. (R. 71-
75). 
FACTS RELEVANT TO ISSUE 4 
(Serious effect on employer) 
28. The ALJ found that the employer provided no evidence that 
it had been harmed in any way by Petitioner's conduct. (R. 36). 
29. However, the ALJ nevertheless ruled in favor of the 
employer, stating that harm was shown. (R. 39). 
30. Petitioner specifically appealed this issue to the Board, 
arguing the employer failed to show how Petitioner's actions had an 
adverse effect on the employee's job or the employer's interest and 
that the ALJ's decision was not consistent with his findings. (R. 
59-60). 
31. In it's decision, the Board never addressed the issue of 
whether the employer showed the actions of Petitioner had a serious 
8 
effect on the employee's job or the employer's interests. (R. 71-
75). 
FACTS RELEVANT TO ISSUE 5 
(Employer's burden) 
32. The ALJ found that WalMart failed to provide the 
necessary documentation prior to hearing, but went ahead with the 
hearing stating that his decision would be based on the testimony. 
(R. 13). 
33. The employer representative had little knowledge of the 
events regarding Petitioner's discharge and requested the court 
permit the reading of several employee statements. (R. 16). 
34. The court specifically ruled the statements to be 
inadmissible. (R. 16-17) 
35. The employer representative testified regarding the 
statements which the Court had ruled were inadmissible. (R. 17-
18). 
36. Petitioner specifically appealed this issue to the Board, 
arguing that the hearsay testimony was insufficient to meet the 
employer's burden. (R. 60-63). 
37. In it's decision, the Board never addressed the issue of 
whether the employer met its burden in establishing just cause. 
(R. 71-75). 
38. On or about January 30, 1996, Petitioner filed a petition 
for writ of review with this court, seeking review of the decision 
of the Board. (R. 79-80). 
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SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
The Employer's policy requiring switchboard operators walk 100 
feet for a drink of water is an unreasonable employment practice. 
The determination by the Board that it is a reasonable employment 
practice, should be reversed. The failure of the Board to consider 
the issues of knowledge, control, serious effect on the employer, 
or whether the employer met its burden at hearing was arbitrary and 
capricious and should be reversed. 
ARGUMENT 
I. IT IS NOT A REASONABLE EMPLOYMENT PRACTICE TO REQUIRE A 
SWITCHBOARD OPERATOR TO WALK 100 FEET TO GET A DRINK OF WATER. 
Petitioner is a 57 year old female who was hired by WalMart 
Stores on or about November 8, 1990. She was fired on or about 
August 1, 1995. (R. 1). Petitioner was fired for having a drink of 
water in the phone area. (R. 18-19). At the time of firing, 
Petitioner was a telephone switchboard operator. (R. 15). 
At hearing, Petitioner testified that "I did have strept [sic] 
throat as well as a virus and it was very hard to spend so many 
hours without a drink and when he says it was easy for me to go 
back and get a drink off the sales floor was not.1' (R. 20). 
The employer representative testified that fl[a]ny time she 
wanted to get a drink of water, we made it available to her. She 
could go right inside the backroom, which is only about a hundred 
feet away from the fitting room. . . ." (R. 17). (Emphasis added). 
10 
The ALJ stated "the Administrative Law Judge finds the 
employer offered the claimant a reasonable alternative by 
permitting her to keep the beverage relatively close at hand but 
out of the customer sales area.11 (R. 38). 
Petitioner specifically appealed this holding to the Board, 
asserting that requiring Petitioner walk 100 feet to get a drink of 
water when her mouth would become dry from answering phones was not 
a reasonable employment practice. (R. 56-57). 
In affirming the ALJ, the Board stated: 
The Board of Review is of the opinion that the employer's 
policy may have been excessively harsh for the period 
that the claimant had strep throat. However, as noted 
above, the problem had been going on for several months. 
The claimant did not simply violate the policy during the 
time she had strep throat. If the claimant had shown a 
willingness to comply with the policy prior to the time 
she developed strep throat, the Board of Review would be 
more persuaded by her arguments that she needed the water 
close at hand during the time she had strep throat that 
the employer should reasonably have made an exception for 
her during that time.11 (R. 73). 
It is Petitioner's contention that the employer's policy was 
excessively harsh regardless of whether Petitioner had a strep 
infection. The fact she may have also been ill is of little 
consequence, relative to the issue of whether the policy is an 
unreasonable employment practice. Requiring a phone operator to 
walk a distance of 100 feet for a drink of water is simply not 
reasonable, and does not support a finding of just cause for 
discharge. 
In reviewing the Board's determination of just cause, the 
appellate court will determine whether the Board's decision was 
reasonable pursuant to UTAH CODE ANN. § 63-46b-16(4)(h)(i); 
11 
Albertsons Inc. v. Dept. of Employment Security, 854 P.2d 570, 573 
(Utah App. 1993). 
The decision of the Board in this situation was not 
reasonable. Rule 562-5b-102(1)(a), Utah Administrative Code 
states: 
(a) Culpability. 
This is the seriousness of the conduct or the severity of 
the offense as it affects continuance of the employment 
relationship. The discharge must have been necessary to 
avoid actual or potential harm to the employer's rightful 
interests. A discharge would not be considered 
"necessary11 if it is not consistent with reasonable 
employment practices. . . . (Emphasis added). 
Rule 562-5b-108(1)(a), Utah Administrative Code, further 
states: 
The reasonableness of the employer's rules will depend on 
the necessity for that rule as it affects the employer's 
interests. Rules which are contrary to general public 
policy or which infringe upon the recognized rights and 
privileges of individuals may not be reasonable. An 
employer must have broader prerogatives in regulating 
conduct when employees are on the job than when they are 
not. An employer must be able to make rules for employee 
on-the-job conduct that reasonably further the legitimate 
business interests of the employer. An employer is not 
required to impose only minimum standards, but there may 
be some justifiable cause for violations of rules that 
are unreasonable or unduly harsh, rigorous or exacting. 
(Emphasis added). 
Here Petitioner worked eight hours a day as a switchboard 
operator. (R. 15). Regardless of whether she had an illness, the 
policy she walk 100 feet to get a drink of water was unreasonable. 
Petitioner's mouth would get dry answering the switchboard. If she 
got up and walked 100 feet to a back room to get a drink of water 
every time her mouth was dry, she simply could not answer the 
phones as necessary. 
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The requirement Petitioner answer the phone as well as walk 
100 feet every time her mouth became dry is inconsistent if not 
impossible. Such a requirement clearly runs contrary to general 
public policy and infringes upon Petitioner's recognized rights and 
privileges. For that reason, employer's policy was not consistent 
with reasonable employment practices and the decision of the Board 
should be reversed as being unreasonable. 
II. THE BOARD'S FAILURE TO CONSIDER PETITIONER'S ARGUMENT THE 
EMPLOYER NEVER SHOWED THE ELEMENT OF KNOWLEDGE WAS ARBITRARY AND 
CAPRICIOUS. 
The employer representative testified that the employee manual 
states that it is unacceptable to have food or drink on the floor 
area. (R. 16). (Emphasis added). However, he admitted that 
Petitioner's work area was separate from the customer flow area. 
(R. 29). Petitioner testified that her work area was not on the 
floor area. (R. 24-25). 
The employer representative further testified that many 
employees had drinks in the area where Petitioner had her drink. 
(R. 30). He also testified that Petitioner was the only employee 
ever fired for having a drink of water in the phone area. (R.30). 
Petitioner testified she was not the only phone operator who 
had water in the phone area. (R. 23). She also testified she was 
fired because of a prior problem with the employer representative. 
(R. 20). 
In spite of foregoing facts, the ALJ found Petitioner had the 
requisite knowledge of the store policy. (R. 38). Petitioner 
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specifically appealed that decision to the Board. In her 
''Memorandum in Support of Appeal,11 (R. 53-66) Petitioner argued as 
follows: 
The employee must have had a knowledge of the conduct 
which the employer expected . . . Knowledge may not be 
established unless the employer gave a clear explanation 
of the expected behavior or had a pertinent written 
policy, except in the case of a flagrant violation of a 
universal standard of behavior. If the employer's 
expectations are unclear, ambiguous or inconsistent, the 
existence of knowledge is not shown. Rule 562-5b-
102(1)(b), Utah Administrative Code. [R. 57-58]. 
Here there was no clear explanation of the policy. 
Claimant was initially allowed to take drinks into the 
fitting room. At some point in time, the Employer 
decided to reverse this policy in favor of the company 
handbook regarding such behavior. The handbook states 
that f'eating food, drink, or chewing gum while on the 
sales floor is unacceptable behavior.11 (Transcript of 
hearing at page 4). [R. 16] (Emphasis added). [R. 58]. 
Claimant testified the area where she answered phones was 
not in the general customer area, specifically stating 
that f,it was not out on the floor11. (Transcript of 
Hearing at page 12). [R. 24]. This testimony was 
actually supported by the Employer representative who 
testified that the area in which Claimant was working is 
separated from the regular customer flow area. [R. 58] 
(Transcript of hearing at page 17). [R. 29]. 
Actions of other employees shows there was no coherent 
policy regarding beverages in Claimant's work area. This 
is born out by Claimant's testimony that there were 
numerous other employees who were taking beverages into 
the phone area. [R. 58] (Transcript of Hearing at page 
18). [R. 30]. 
The Employer manual implies it is acceptable to have 
beverages in the non-floor areas. Claimant did not work 
out on the floor. Therefore, it is questionable Employer 
even had a company policy regarding drink in the phone 
area of which Claimant would have knowledge. [R. 58]. 
At best Employer's policy was unclear, ambiguous or 
inconsistent. The employee manual implies it is 
perfectly acceptable to have beverages in the non-floor 
areas. The purported verbal policy regarding beverages 
in the non-floor areas is inconsistent with that policy. 
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That is born out by Claimant's testimony that many 
employees had beverages in the phone area. This policy, 
if it did exist, was so inconsistent and ambiguous that 
the employees could not have knowledge. [R. 59]. 
In it's decision, the Board never addressed the issue of 
whether the element of knowledge was shown by the employer. (R. 
71-75). 
This Court has held that: 
The question of whether the Commission's action 
constitutes arbitrary action for want of adequate 
findings is governed by our determination of whether this 
court is able to conduct a meaningful review. Whether 
the findings are adequate is therefore a legal 
determination that requires no deference to the 
Commission. 
Adams v. Board of Review of Indus. Com'n, 821 P.2d 1, 4 (Utah App. 
1991). 
Petitioner's "Memorandum in Support of Appeal" clearly set 
forth the relevant facts and authority regarding the issue of 
knowledge. (R. 57-59). Since the Board's decision makes no 
reference to this element, its decision should be reversed as being 
arbitrary and capricious. 
III. THE BOARD'S FAILURE TO CONSIDER PETITIONER'S ARGUMENT THE 
EMPLOYER NEVER SHOWED THE ELEMENT OF CONTROL WAS ARBITRARY AND 
CAPRICIOUS. 
Petitioner testified she had a drink in the phone area, in 
part, because of a strep infection from which she was suffering. 
(R. 20). The ALJ, while finding that Petitioner was discharged for 
cause, made no finding regarding control on the part of Petitioner. 
(R. 35-40). Therefore, Petitioner appealed to the Board on the 
basis she did not have the requisite control to abide by the drink 
15 
policy because of the strep infection. (R. 59). In her 
"Memorandum in Support of Appeal," (R. 53-66) Petitioner argued as 
follows: 
In defining control, Rule 562-5b-102(1)(c)(2), Utah 
Administrative Code states: 
Just cause may not be established when the 
reason for discharge is based on mere 
mistakes, inefficiency, failure of performance 
as the result of inability or incapacity, 
inadvertence, in isolated instances, good 
faith errors in judgment or in the exercise of 
discretion, minor but casual or unintentional 
carelessness or negligence. (Emphasis added) 
[R. 57]. 
In this situation, Claimant had a drink of water in an 
area not frequented by patrons. Many other employees did 
the same thing. The policy regarding drinks in 
Claimant's work area, were at best, ambiguous and vague. 
She had a strep infection and was answering phones 
causing her mouth to become dry. This may be classified 
as a good faith error in judgment. However, it is not 
sufficient to discharge for cause. [R. 57]. 
In it's decision, the Board never directly addressed the issue 
of whether the element of control was shown by the employer. (R. 
71-75). 
Petitioner's "Memorandum in Support of Appeal" clearly set 
forth the relevant facts and authority regarding the issue of 
control. (R. 59). Since the Board's decision makes no reference 
to this element, its decision should be reversed as being arbitrary 
and capricious pursuant to Adams v. Board of Review of Indus. 
Com'n, 821 P.2d 1, 4 (Utah App. 1991). 
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IV. THE BOARD'S FAILURE TO CONSIDER PETITIONER'S ARGUMENT THAT THE 
EMPLOYER NEVER SHOWED THE ACTIONS OF PETITIONER HAD A SERIOUS 
EFFECT ON THE EMPLOYEE'S JOB OR THE EMPLOYER'S INTERESTS WAS 
ARBITRARY AND CAPRICIOUS. 
In his findings, the ALJ determined that the employer provided 
no evidence that it had been harmed in any way by Petitioner's 
conduct. (R. 36). Nevertheless, the ALJ stated that the employer 
had been harmed. (R.39). Because of these inconsistencies, 
Petitioner appealed to the Board the issue of whether the employer 
had showed whether Petitioner's actions had a serious effect on the 
employee's job or the employer's interest. (R. 59-60). 
In her "Memorandum in Support of Appeal," (R. 53-66) Petitioner 
argued as follows: 
The employer has the burden of showing that "such acts 
have a serious effect on the employee's job or the 
employer's interests. Rule 562-5b-102(1)(c)(3), Utah 
Administrative Code. [R. 59-60]. 
There is no evidence in the transcript of there being an 
adverse effect on the Employer because of Claimant's 
conduct. In fact, the ALJ stated: 
"The information provided by the employer 
representative cited only that the claimant 
had a drink container in the work area but the 
representative did not offer any information 
as to how the employer was harmed by the 
claimant's actions or to show the claimant had 
received any warnings or disciplinary action 
for her conduct." [R. 60]. (Exhibit "F" at 
page 2). [R. 36]. 
The decision of the ALJ is very confusing in this regard. 
The evidence presented does not support the Employer's 
claim. The ALJ even points this out, but then goes on 
and rules in favor of the Employer. The findings by the 
ALJ and resulting decision are clearly contrary to 
existing law, and the decision should be reversed. [R. 
60]. 
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In it's decision, the Board never addressed the issue of 
whether the employer showed the actions of Petitioner had a serious 
effect on the employee's job or the employer's interests. (R. Il-
ls). 
Petitioner's ''Memorandum in Support of Appeal,11 clearly set 
forth the relevant facts and authority regarding the issue of 
whether Petitioner's conduct had an serious effect on the 
employee's job or the employer's interests. (R. 59). Since the 
Board's decision makes no reference to this issue, its decision 
should be reversed as being arbitrary and capricious pursuant to 
Adams v. Board of Review of Indus, Com'n, 821 P.2d 1, 4 (Utah App. 
1991). 
V. THE BOARD'S FAILURE TO CONSIDER PETITIONER'S ARGUMENT THAT THE 
EMPLOYER NEVER MET ITS BURDEN TO SUPPORT A SHOWING OF JUST CAUSE 
FOR DISCHARGE WAS ARBITRARY AND CAPRICIOUS. 
The ALJ found that WalMart failed to provide the necessary 
documentation prior to the hearing, but went ahead with the hearing 
stating that his decision would be based on the testimony at 
hearing. (R. 13) The employer representative had little knowledge 
of the events regarding Petitioner's discharge and requested the 
court permit the reading of several employee statements. (R. 16). 
The court specifically ruled the statements to be inadmissible. 
(R. 16-17) Nevertheless, the employer representative testified 
regarding the statements which the Court had already ruled to be 
inadmissible. (R. 17-18). 
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Based on the foregoing facts, Petitioner appealed to the 
Board, arguing the evidence produced by the employer failed to meet 
the requisite burden. (R. 60-63). 
In her "Memorandum in Support of Appeal," (R. 53-66) Petitioner 
argued as follows: 
It is well established that the employer shoulders the 
burden of proof in establishing just cause for discharge. 
The employer has the burden of proof which is 
the responsibility to establish the facts 
resulting in the discharge. The Employer is 
required by Subsection 35-4-11(7)(a) to keep 
accurate records and to provide correct 
information to the Department for proper 
administration of the Act. 
Rule 562-5b-103(1), Utah Administrative Code. [R. 60]. 
As this section indicates, the employer is required to 
keep adequate records and provide necessary information 
to the Department. However, that was not done in this 
situation. At hearing the ALJ stated: 
I have reviewed through the information in the 
record. I can't read the employer's 
information, I don't have a really too much of 
an idea that they gave the department 
originally; however, in their appeal, they 
keep referring to the Claimant as "he" and I 
don't understand that at all. [R. 60-61]. 
(Transcript of Hearing at page 1) [R. 13]. 
The failure of the employer to provide information to the 
department was further addressed in the ALJ's decision. 
There he stated: 
[T]he employer representative failed to offer 
the Department comprehensive information 
regarding the three elements of just cause in 
the decision. This representative has been 
involved in providing unemployment benefits to 
this Department for several years and the 
representative knows the necessity of 
providing complete and comprehensive 
information to the Department." [R. 61]. 
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(Exhibit "F" at page 5). [R. 39]. 
Information provided the St. George Job Service office 
was equally lacking. In responding to the Employer 
Notice of Claim Filed, the Employer did not respond to 
questions 1, 2, 3a, 3c, 3d, 3e, 4 or 5. [R. 61]. (See, 
Exhibit "B"). [R. 5]. 
Due to the failure of the Employer to provide information 
prior to hearing, the ALJ made his decision based solely 
on information provided at hearing: 
So, I wondered if there was some confusion 
here but what I'm going to do and I want . 
. I guess the point I'm trying to make is, 
what is given to me today in this hearing is 
what I will be basing my decision on, not so 
much what's in this record. The record gives 
me an idea of what the department has made 
their ruling on and some general information 
but I will not be basing the decision on this 
record but on what is said here today. [R. 
61 ]. 
(Transcript of hearing at page 1). [R. 13]. 
WalMart's representative had limited knowledge of the 
circumstances regarding Claimant's discharge. Therefore, 
he requested the ALJ allow him to read statements from 
WalMart management regarding Claimant's alleged conduct. 
(Transcript of hearing at page 4). [R. 16]. 
The ALJ informed the Employer representative the 
statements were hearsay stating "I won't allow it11. 
(Transcript of hearing at pages 4-5). [R. 16-17]. 
Nevertheless, the most damning portion of the 
representative's testimony were the hearsay statements 
the ALJ had already ruled inadmissible. The statements 
alleged Claimant was told on many occasions to not have 
any drink in the phone area. The representative 
testified as follows: 
I have a statement from Mar . . . from Peggy 
Stapley, who was the Assistant Manager in 
Charge and it was told to Mary about two to 
three months prior to when we let her go. [R. 
62]. 
(Transcript of Hearing at page 5). [R. 17]. 
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And Janette Collinsf I have a statement from 
her, who was also an Assistant Manager, who 
also talked to Mary specifically about not 
having it in there. [R. 62]. 
(Transcript of Hearing at page 6). [R. 18]. 
The final incident were associates came to me, 
three different associates, came to me and 
told me that it was still continuing, that she 
wasn't changing, that she had made the 
statement, of course it's hearsay because I 
didn't hear her say it, but what they told me 
she said is that "I don't care what management 
says, I'm going to have it out here.11 [R. 
62]. 
(Transcript of Hearing at page 6). [R. 18]. 
While Claimant denied these allegations, she had no 
opportunity to confront the individuals who made these 
alleged statements. [R. 62-63]. 
In this situation the Employer provided the Department 
with almost no information prior to hearing, though 
required to do so. The Employer representative present 
at the hearing had limited knowledge regarding the facts 
of the case. The basis of his testimony was hearsay the 
ALJ had ruled inadmissible. As stated previously, the 
burden of proof is the Employer's. The lack of 
information provided prior to hearing and the hearsay 
provided by the Employer representative clearly failed to 
satisfy the Employer burden of proof in this case. [R. 
63]. 
In it's decision, the Board never addressed the issue of 
whether the employer met its burden in establishing just cause for 
discharge (R. 71-75). 
Petitioner's "Memorandum in Support of Appeal11 clearly set 
forth the relevant facts and authority regarding the issue of 
whether the employer met its burden. (R. 60-63). Since the 
Board's decision makes no reference to this issue, its decision 
should be reversed as being arbitrary and capricious pursuant to 
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Adams v. Board of Review of Indus, Com'n, 821 P.2d 1, 4 (Utah App. 
1991). 
CONCLUSION 
It is well established that the Employment Security Act should 
be liberally construed and administered to lighten the burdens of 
the unemployed. Johnson v. Board of Review, 7 Utah 2d 113, 117-18; 
320 P.2d 315 (1958). The decision of the Board does not lighten 
the burdens of Petitioner. 
The determination Employer's policy requiring switchboard 
operators walk a distance of 100 feet for a drink of water is not 
a reasonable employment practice and certainly did not lighten 
Petitioner's burden. The Board's determination was unreasonable 
and should be reversed. 
The Board's failure to address the issues of knowledge, 
control, serious effect on employer, and whether the employer met 
its burden at hearing was arbitrary and capricious, did not lighten 
Petitioner's burden and should also be reversed. 
DATED this 10th day of April, 1996, 
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ADDENDUM 
Rule 562-5b-102(1)(a), Utah Administrative Code. 
(a) Culpability. 
This is the seriousness of the conduct or the severity of 
the offense as it affects continuance of the employment 
relationship. The discharge must have been necessary to 
avoid actual or potential harm to the employer's rightful 
interests. A discharge would not be considered 
f,necessaryff if it is not consistent with reasonable 
employment practices. The wrongfulness of the conduct 
must be considered in the context of the particular 
employment and how it affects the employer's rights. If 
the conduct was an isolated incident of poor judgment and 
there is no expectation that the conduct will be 
continued or repeated, potential harm may not be shown 
and therefore it is not necessary to discharge the 
employee. 
Rule 562-5b-102(1)(b), Utah Administrative Code. 
(b) Knowledge. 
The employee must have had a knowledge of the conduct 
which the employer expected. It is not necessary that 
the claimant intended to cause harm to the employer, but 
he should reasonably have been able to anticipate the 
effect his conduct would have. Knowledge may not be 
established unless the employer gave a clear explanation 
of the expected behavior or had a pertinent written 
policy, except in the case of a flagrant violation of a 
universal standard of behavior. If the employer's 
expectations are unclear, ambiguous or inconsistent, the 
existence of knowledge is not shown. A specific warning 
is one way of showing that the employee had knowledge of 
the expected conduct. After the employee is given a 
warning he should be given an opportunity to correct 
objectionable conduct. Additional violations occurring 
after the warning would be necessary to establish just 
cause for a discharge. 
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Rule 562-5b-102(1)(c)(2), Utah Administrative Code. 
Just cause may not be established when the reason for 
discharge is based on mere mistakes, inefficiency, 
failure of performance as the result of inability or 
incapacity, inadvertence, in isolated instances, good 
faith errors in judgment or in the exercise of 
discretion, minor but casual or unintentional 
carelessness or negligence. These examples of conduct 
are not disqualifying because of the lack of knowledge or 
control. However, continued inefficiency, repeated 
carelessness, or lack of care exercised by ordinary, 
reasonable workers in similar circumstances, may be 
disqualifying depending on the reason and degree of the 
carelessness, the knowledge and control of the employee. 
Rule 562-5b-102(1)(c)(3), Utah Administrative Code. 
The term "just cause11 as used in Subsection 35-4-5(2) (a) 
does not lessen the requirement that there be some fault 
on the part of the employee involved. Prior to the 1983 
addition of the term Mjust cause" the Commission 
interpreted Subsection 5(2)(a) to require an intentional 
infliction of harm or intentional disregard of the 
employer's interests. The intent of the Legislature in 
adding the words "just cause" to Subsection 35-4-5(2)(a) 
was apparently to correct this restrictive 
interpretation. While some fault must be present, it is 
sufficient that the acts were intended, the consequences 
were reasonably foreseeable, and that such acts have a 
serious effect on the employee's job or the employer's 
interests. 
Rule 562-5b-103(1), Utah Administrative Code. 
The employer has the burden of proof which is the 
responsibility to establish the facts resulting in the 
discharge. The Employer is required by Subsection 35-4-
11(7)(a) to keep accurate records and to provide correct 
information to the Department for proper administration 
of the Act. Although the employer has the burden to 
establish just cause for the discharge, if sufficient 
facts are obtained from the claimant, a decision will be 
made based on the information available. The failure of 
one party to provide information does not necessarily 
result in a ruling favorable to the other party. 
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Rule 562-5b-108(1)(a), Utah Administrative Code. 
The reasonableness of the employer's rules will depend on 
the necessity for that rule as it affects the employer's 
interests. Rules which are contrary to general public 
policy or which infringe upon the recognized rights and 
privileges of individuals may not be reasonable. An 
employer must have broader prerogatives in regulating 
conduct when employees are on the job than when they are 
not. An employer must be able to make rules for employee 
on-the-job conduct that reasonably further the legitimate 
business interests of the employer. An employer is not 
required to impose only minimum standards, but there may 
be some justifiable cause for violations of rules that 
are unreasonable or unduly harsh, rigorous or exacting. 
When rules are changed, adequate notice and reasonable 
opportunity to comply must be afforded. If the employee 
believes a rule is unreasonable, he has the 
responsibility to discuss concerns with the employer and 
give the employer an opportunity to take corrective 
action. 
26 
